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Abstract
Executive functions play an important role in cognitive development and, during the 
preschool years especially, children’s performance is limited in tasks that demand 
flexibility in their behavior.  We asked whether preschoolers would exhibit limitations 
when they are required to apply a general rule in the context of novel stimuli on every 
trial (the “opposites” task).  Two types of inhibitory processing were measured: response 
interference (resistance to interference from a competing response) and proactive 
interference (resistance to interference from a previously relevant rule).  Group data show 
three-year-olds have difficulty inhibiting prepotent tendencies under these conditions, 
whereas five-year-olds’ accuracy is near ceiling in the task.  
Keywords: Executive functions, inhibition, preschool
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The Opposites task: Using general rules to test cognitive flexibility in preschoolers
During the early years, children become increasingly able to control their actions 
in a context appropriate fashion (Diamond, 1988; Diamond & Doar, 1989; Diamond & 
Gilbert, 1989). This increased control depends on the development of executive functions 
and is accompanied by changes in the anatomical and functional structure of the brain 
(Amso & Casey, 2006). Executive processes are thought to underlie children’s 
performance on laboratory tests in various cognitive domains, including naïve physics
(e.g., Hood, Wilson & Dyson, 2006), naïve mathematics (e.g., Bull, Espy & Wiebe, 
2008), and naïve psychology (e.g., Leslie, German & Polizzi, 2005). Moreover, cognitive 
flexibility, and behavioral regulation more generally, likely serves as a scaffold for 
appropriate behavior in school settings (Diamond, Barnett, Thomas & Munro, 2007; 
Mischel, Shoda & Rodriguez, 1989; Duckworth & Seligman, 2005; Blair & Razza, 2007; 
McClelland et al., 2007).
Executive functions are commonly viewed as a set of distinct abilities, and there 
is an emerging consensus that central components include working memory, set shifting,
and inhibition (Huizinga, Dolan, & Van der Molen, 2006; Davidson, Amso, Anderson, & 
Diamond, 2006; Carlson, 2005; Casey, Giedd, & Thomas, 2000; Lehto, Juujarvi, 
Koositra & Pulkkinen, 2003). Nonetheless, the theoretical landscape presents some grey 
areas, particularly concerning inhibition (see for a discussion MacLeod, Dodd, Sheard, 
Wilson, & Bibi, 2003). Current measures of inhibitory processing are classified on a 
variety of orthogonal dimensions: There are conflict vs. delay tasks (Carlson & Moses, 
2001), hot vs. cold tasks (Hongwanishkul, Happaney, Lee & Zelazo, 2005), response 
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interference vs. proactive interference tasks (Friedman & Miyake, 2004), response given 
vs. open tasks (Simpson & Riggs, 2005), effortful vs. automatic inhibition tasks (Nigg, 
2000), and so on. The relation amongst these different classification systems remains 
unclear, and researchers differ in how they fit specific tasks to the dimensions.  
Several studies have used sophisticated statistical methods (e.g., confirmatory 
factor analysis) to evaluate the relationship between different measures of executive 
functions, including inhibitory resources. Huizinga et al. (2006) tested 7- to 21-year-olds 
with a battery of tasks, including three aimed at measuring inhibition of motor responses. 
Inter-correlations among the tasks were small and mostly non-significant, suggesting 
little coherence amongst various aspects of the inhibition construct.  In a similar 
investigation of executive functioning in 9- to 12-year-olds, Van der Sluis, de Jong & van 
der Luij (2007) did not find a distinct inhibitory factor in their confirmatory factor 
analysis.1  In contrast, Miyake et al. (2000) found weak, but significant, correlations 
amongst adults’ scores on their inhibitory tasks.  This discrepancy could be explained by 
methodological divergences (e.g., Huizinga et al. and Van der Sluis et al. controlled for 
non-executive factors while Miyake et al. did not) or differential organization of 
executive processes as a function of brain maturation.  Given the elusive nature of 
inhibitory processes within the broader context of executive functions, it is desirable to 
have a battery of tasks that recruit a variety of capacities while minimizing noise due to 
variable task demands.  The aim of the present study is to develop a measure of open 
response conflict inhibition targeting both response interference and proactive 
interference.  This novel combination of features is explained below.
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Measures of preschoolers’ inhibitory processing typically require children to 
respond to a small set of stimuli, by following rules that specify the exact response 
required. For example, in the day/night task, children are instructed to say “night” when 
shown cards depicting daytime and to say “day” to cards depicting nighttime (Diamond, 
Kirkham & Amso, 2002; Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994). Three-year-olds often fail 
to follow these instructions, and often err by saying “day” for day cards and night for 
“night” cards.2
To consider a second example, the dimensional change card sort (DCCS) requires 
children to sort cards into two piles first using one rule (e.g., put blue things here, put red 
things there) and then using a second rule (e.g., put cars here, put flowers there).  Three-
year-olds easily sort according to the first rule, but often have difficulty in switching to 
the second rule (Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995; Zelazo, Müller, Frye, & Marcovitch, 2003; 
Zelazo, Frye & Rapus, 1996).3  As in the day/night task, the task rules specify the desired 
stimulus-response mappings, and so the same responses remain correct for the duration of 
each sorting rule. The main point for current purposes is that success in both the 
day/night and DCCS tasks can be achieved using rules that concretely link a small set of 
stimuli to specific desired responses.  The instructions children receive specify which 
response should be produced in the presence of each stimulus and are therefore classified 
as “response-given” tasks.
In everyday life, however, children are often required to apply rules that do not 
specify a concrete response. Consider a girl who has been asked to follow the request or 
rule: “Put your toys away right now!” Following this rule will likely require inhibition, 
because the girl must overcome her natural tendency to play with each toy, and to instead 
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select the conflicting response of putting each where it belongs. Unlike the rules in most 
inhibitory tasks, the rule “Put your toys away right now!” does not specify a particular 
input (e.g., day card) because the rule can be applied to any of the girl’s toys. And the
rule does not identify an exact response (e.g., say “night”) because the various toys 
belong in different places. We refer to such rules as “general” rules.
In putting away her toys, the girl follows a rule that is more open or general than 
the rules typically used in response-given inhibitory tasks. One task that appears to use 
general rules is the Whisper task (Kochanska et al., 1996). In this task, children are asked 
to whisper the names of different familiar cartoon characters. Three-year-olds find this 
difficult because their first tendency is to shout out the names. The Whisper task requires 
applying a general rule to the varying pictures, yet the part of the response program 
(whisper, don’t shout) that poses difficulty remains the same from trial-to-trial. The rule 
resolves the conflict by explicitly stating “whisper”.  Thus, the rule constrains the 
response to such a degree that the task does not require much generalization across trials.  
The present experiment introduces the opposites task, a measure of inhibitory 
control that requires preschoolers to apply a general rules across varying stimuli, while 
also requiring varying responses on every trial. Most existing inhibition tasks for 
preschoolers either require children to overcome proactive interference from a previously 
relevant rule (e.g, the DCCS) or to overcome the pull of a competing response (e.g, the 
day/night task). However, the opposites task assesses both response interference and 
proactive interference, while equating for task demands. On each of several trials, 
children were shown two pictures which semantically opposed (or contrasted) each other, 
and the experimenter named one of them. In a first testing block, children learned either a 
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congruent or an incongruent rule. For example, children learning the congruent rule had 
to point to a picture of an open door upon hearing the word “open”; those learning the 
incongruent rule had to point to the picture of a closed door when they heard the word 
“open”. Comparing performance across these two rules gives a measure of response 
interference. Response interference should arise when children are asked to go against a 
prepotent tendency, in this case the tendency to point to the picture of the word they hear.
4 In a second testing block, children either continued using the same rule or switched 
rules. To successfully switch rules, children needed to overcome proactive interference
from the previously relevant rule.  For example, if children first learn the congruent rule, 
then they need to switch rules in the second block and follow the incongruent rule.  
There were therefore four conditions, varying in which rule was used in the first 
block, and in whether or not there was a rule switch in the second block.  The conditions 
were expected to differ in levels of inhibitory effort required for success.  We expected 
that learning the incongruent rule in the first block would introduce difficulty (due to 
response interference) relative to learning the congruent rule on the first block.  Similarly, 
requiring a rule switch in the second block would be more difficult (due to proactive 
interference) than allowing the child to continue using the same rule.  We expected that 
the congruent-congruent condition would yield the highest performance overall because 
the rule did not require inhibition and there was no rule switch.  We predicted that the 
most difficult block would be the second block of the “congruent-incongruent” condition 
because it would combine both response interference and proactive interference.  We 
expected to observe age-related improvements in first block incongruent performance and 
in second block switch performance.  Specifically, three-year-olds should show more 
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errors than five-year-olds in the incongruent first block.  Three-year-olds should also 
show more errors than five-year-olds in the second block after switching rules.
Experiment 
Method
Participants.  The experiment was completed by 244 children (115 boys, 129 
girls) who were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions: congruent-congruent, 
congruent-incongruent, incongruent- incongruent, incongruent-congruent. There were 67 
three-year-olds (M = 43 months, SD = 3.0 months), 100 four-year-olds (M = 54 months, 
SD = 3.2 months), and 77 five-year-olds (M = 64 months, SD = 4.0 months).  Eight 
additional children were excluded from the analysis. Five children were excluded because 
they were not following the basic turn-taking structure of our task, two were excluded 
due to experimenter error, and one was excluded due to distracting circumstances during 
the test session.
Materials.  The experiment used an 8x11 inch binder, containing 14 laminated 
pages. Each page showed two pictures side by side, separated by a line.  The pictures 
were approximately four inches in diameter.  Some pages displayed semantically opposed 
pairs of pictures (e.g., open and closed doors), while others displayed variations along a 
relevant dimension (e.g., swimming and flying ducks; see Appendix).  For 191 children 
the experimenter went through the book from front to back and for 53 children the 
experimenter went through the book from back to front (14 three-year-olds, of whom 
seven learned the incongruent rule first, 20 four-year-olds of whom ten learned the 
incongruent rule first, and 19 five-year-olds of whom nine learned the incongruent rule 
first).
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Procedure.  The same female experimenter administered every individual session 
during school hours in a quiet area of the child’s preschool.  The task consisted of two 
blocks of trials. Each block began with the experimenter giving the instructions. At the 
start of congruent blocks, children were told: “We are going to play a game.  In this 
game, I am going to say a word.  Then, on your turn, you just point to the picture I said.  
Ready?”. At the start of incongruent blocks, children were told: “We are going to play a 
silly game. I'm going to say a word. Then you point to a picture on my page. But guess 
what? Don't point to the one I say. You point to the other picture. OK? Whatever you do, 
don't point to the picture I say, you have to show me the other one! Ready?”).
In each trial a different pair of pictures was displayed; the experimenter reminded 
children of the rule (e.g., “pointing to the other picture, not the one I say….”) and then 
said the target word. The first trial of each block was a training trial. Children who passed 
this trial were told that they had done a great job and were ready to play the game “for 
real”.  Children who pointed to the wrong picture in the first training trial were reminded 
of the rule, heard the target word once again, and were then given a second chance to 
point.  Those who pointed to the wrong picture on this second training trial were shown 
the correct response, were reminded of the rule again, and were told that they would start 
the game for real. The remaining six trials in each block were test trials.  The child 
received a sticker at the end of the session, which lasted approximately 10 minutes.  
For training trials, we counted the number of attempts children required. Children 
who passed on the first training trial received a score of 1, children who passed on the
second training trial received a score of 2, and children who failed both training trials
received a score of three. For test trials, the first picture pointed to was scored, even if a 
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second response was made. Children were given 1 for each correct answer in each block, 
so scores ranged from zero to six.
Results
We first examined whether gender was a factor in our pointing task.  A 2 x 2 
ANOVA (gender x block) showed that gender did not significantly affect preschoolers’ 
performance in any of the training or in any of the test blocks (block one training: F(1, 
240) = 2.778, p = .097; block one test: F(1, 240) = .125, p = .724; block two training: 
F(1, 240) = .901, p = .343; block two test: F(1, 240) = .031, p = .861).  Gender was not 
considered as a factor in subsequent analyses.
Next, data were entered into 2 x 2 (order x block) ANOVA to test whether the 
order of presentation of our pages affected children’s training or test performance.  There 
was a significant effect of order on block one training (F(1, 240) = 5.004, p = .026).  
Children who saw the pages in reverse order needed less training (M = 1.19, SD = .483) 
than children who saw the book in the original order (M = 1.40, SD = .673).  However, 
the means for both groups remained under two, showing that on average all children were 
able to correctly learn the rules during training.  Furthermore, because there was no effect 
of order on the number of correct answers during the test phases, we collapsed the two 
orders for subsequent analyses.
We then entered children’s scores into a 3 x 2 x 2 ANOVA (age x first block rule 
x rule switch).  There was a main effect of age on training scores and on test scores in 
both blocks (block one training, F(1,232) = 5.943, p = .003; η2 = .049 ; block one test,
F(1,232) = 7.082, p = .001, η2 = .058; block two training, F(1,232) =  13.284, p < .001, 
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η2 = .103 ; block two test, F(1,232) = 14.134, p < .001; η2 = .109).  Children got better at 
the task as they got older.  
We found a main effect of rule on training in the first block (F(1,232) = 20.018, p
< .001, η2 = .079).  We also found a main effect of rule on performance on the test items 
in the first block (F(1,232) = 61.778, p < .001, η2 = .210).  During training it was easier to 
learn the congruent rule (mean training trials = 1.18, SD = .464) than the incongruent rule 
(mean training trials = 1.53, SD = .741).  Likewise the congruent rule was easier to apply 
during test than the incongruent rule (see table for means).  
______________________________
INSERT TABLE ABOUT HERE
_______________________________
In the second block there were main effects of rule switching on training scores 
(F(1,232) = 14.531, p < .001, η2 = .059) and on test scores (F(1,232) = 19.899, p < .001, 
η2 = .079).  Children required more trials to learn a new rule in the second block (M = 1.5 
trials for training, SD = .79) than to demonstrate their understanding of a rule they had 
used before (M = 1.2 trials for training, SD = .53).  Children who switched rules in the 
second block performed worse, irrespective of the rule they were required to apply (M = 
4.17, SD = 2.167), than children who continued to use the same rule in the second block 
(M = 5.08, SD = 1.783).  
Switch costs depended on the direction of the switch.  An interaction between first 
block rule and rule switching revealed  higher switch costs when children had to switch 
from using the congruent rule to using the incongruent rule: training scores in second 
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block: (F(2,232) = 15.558, p < .001, η2 = .063) and test scores in second block: (F(2,232) 
= 66.372, p < .001, η2 = .222; see table for means).
There was also a significant three-way interaction between first block rule, rule 
switching and age on training scores (F(2,232) = 5.067, p < .007; η2 = .042) and test 
scores (F(2,232) = 6.946, p = .001; η2 = .056) in the second block.  The difference in 
switching to a congruent versus an incongruent rule was thus somewhat accentuated for
the younger children compared to the older children.  Given that the two-way first block 
rule x rule switching interaction was of moderate effect size (~22% variance accounted 
for) while the three-way interaction showed a small effect size (~6% variance accounted 
for), we think it unlikely that the two-way effect was subsumed under the three-way 
effect.
Discussion
This opposites task allows resistance to both response interference and proactive 
interference to be measured in the context of an open response conflict inhibition task.  
Children were required to apply a general congruent or incongruent rule across varying 
stimuli, and then to switch rules or continue use of the original rule. The incongruent rule 
was harder than the congruent rule, especially for the three-year-olds.  This finding is 
consistent with findings from the day/night task, where three-year-olds typically match 
their verbal response to the stimulus card rather than following the incongruent rule 
(saying “day” to night cards and vice versa; Gerstadt, Hong & Diamond, 1994).  
Children had more trouble switching rules than continuing to use the same rule. 
Children had the most difficulty when they had to switch rules in the second block and to 
apply the difficult, incongruent rule.  This suggests children’s difficulty was compounded 
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when they had to overcome response interference from a prepotent tendency while 
resisting proactive interference from a previous rule.  These findings are similar to three-
year-olds’ behavior in the classic dimensional change card sort, where young 
preschoolers perseverate in sorting cards according to the first rule they use, even though 
they understand a new rule has been introduced (Zelazo, Frye & Rapus, 1996).  
Our findings contrast with findings from other rule switching tasks.  Using the 
same/silly card sorting task, Brooks and colleagues found that three-year-olds 
successfully switched from a block of congruent trials to a block of  incongruent trials, or 
vice versa, as long as there was no irrelevant information on the cards (Brooks, Hanauer, 
Padowska & Rosman, 2003).  Likewise, three-year-olds succeeded in Perner & Lang’s 
(2002) reversal shift task, which also used two blocks of trials and included a second 
block incongruent rule after a rule switch. 
Poorer performance in the opposites task might have resulted because this task 
requires children to apply a general rule across novel stimuli on every trial. Seeing new 
pictures and hearing new words in each trial increases the amount of information children
need to process, perhaps increasing difficulty for young children whose inhibitory 
resources are weak.   Future investigations can target the ways in which preschoolers’ 
cognitive load affects their cognitive flexibility.  
The general nature of the rules in the opposites task elicits behavior which has 
theoretical implications for two dominant theories of cognitive flexibility: the attentional 
inertia account (Kirkham, Cruess & Diamond, 2003; Diamond & Kirkham, 2005) and the 
cognitive control and complexity theory (Zelazo, Müller,  Frye & Marcovitch, 2003).
Neither of these accounts alone predicts that the most difficult condition in our task is the 
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second block of trials after a rule switch when children must apply the incongruent rule to 
varying stimuli.  The attentional inertia account offers an explanation for children’s 
difficulty shifting attention from one perceptual dimension to another (e.g., color to
shape). This account cannot explain children’s difficulty with the incongruent rule in our 
task. Children do not need to overcome a tendency to fixate on a single perceptual 
dimension in order to successfully apply our general rule.  The cognitive control and 
complexity theory focuses on children’s ability to embed complex rule structures in the 
service of their actions, and offers an explanation for why rule-switching is difficult for 
young children. But as far as we can tell, success on the opposites task does not require 
representing an embedded rule structure.
Where does three-year-olds’ difficulty come from in our task?  Accounts of 
preschoolers’ executive functions must include some role for a cognitive mechanism 
whereby children can manipulate their own conceptual representations above and beyond 
any learned stimulus-response pairings.  Where such a capacity is limited we may then 
observe conceptual inertia—difficulty switching away from using a general rule (i.e. one 
not specifying fixed stimulus-response pairings). Conceptual inertia is similar to the 
notion of cognitive inhibition put forth by Nigg (2000).  
We believe older children did better than younger children in our task because 
older children have greater inhibitory resources, allowing them to overcome conceptual 
inertia more readily than younger children. Alternatively, older children might be better 
at applying the incongruent rule because their underlying impulse to match the auditory 
stimulus is weaker than younger children’s (Simpson & Riggs, 2005).  In other words,
performance improvements might reflect decreases in the strength of interfering 
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responses, rather than increases in the capacity to resist interference. To support our 
account over this competing explanation, we decided to test whether the natural impulse
to match the auditory stimulus is as strong for older children as it is for younger children. 
We presented 50 new three- to five-year-olds with the visual and auditory stimuli used in 
the main experiment. This time we did not give them a rule to follow.  Instead we told 
them that they could point “wherever they wanted”.  We recorded the number of times 
these children pointed to the incongruent picture.  Children showed a significant 
matching bias, which did not vary with age. These findings suggest that even five-year-
olds have a natural tendency to produce congruent actions, implying that age-related 
improvements in the incongruent condition of the opposites task result from increasing 
inhibitory capacity.
It is noteworthy that switching to the congruent rule was easier than switching to 
the incongruent rule.  Two other developmental studies of rule-switching found higher 
costs for switching to the congruent rule, as compared to the incongruent rule (Davidson, 
Amso, Anderson, & Diamond, 2006; Crone, Bunge, Van der Molen, & Ridderinkhof, 
2006).  The disparity in the findings may result from differences in the ages of the 
children in question, or from differences in procedures.  Our opposites task presented one 
block of six post-switch trials using the same rule, while Davidson et al. and Crone et al. 
used tasks with mixed blocks, where children were required to switch rules several times 
back and forth.  Thus, on their congruent switch trials, children’s responses might have 
been subject to a phenomenon similar to inhibition of return. Inhibition of return occurs 
when attention to a stimulus is suppressed, making it more difficult to attend to the same 
stimulus on subsequent trials (for a review see Klein, 2000).  Perhaps in Davidson et al. 
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and Crone et al.’s studies, children suppressed the congruent rule when switching to the 
incongruent rule and then had trouble returning to it.  The fact that the congruent rule is 
more natural, as shown by our baseline measure described above, implies that stronger 
inhibitory effort might be required to suppress it when switching away.  Hence inhibition 
of return would be more apparent for congruent trials in mixed blocks, compared to 
incongruent trials.  There was no opportunity for such a mechanism to take hold in our 
task because there was only one rule switch.  
The opposites task offers three attractive features.  First, we have a baseline 
measure of children’s tendency to match the word they hear and the picture they point to 
in the absence of any instructions.  This measure of the prepotent response is crucial in 
any discussion of inhibition.  Indeed it is difficult to talk about inhibition without 
describing what is being inhibited.  The whisper task does not have such a baseline 
(Kochanska et al., 1996).  A control condition for the day/night task associates stimuli 
with semantically unrelated words (Diamond, Kirkham & Amso, 2002).  Although this 
control measures performance in a context presumed to require less inhibitory effort, it 
does not measure prepotent behaviours.   The dimensional change card sort has a 
condition with a congruent rule, but no baseline condition to measure pre-potent 
behaviors (Zelazo, Müller & Marcovitch, 2003).  The baseline condition of our opposites 
task allows us to quantify the urge we are asking the children to go against during the 
more difficult incongruent trials.  
The second feature is that the opposites task contains two measures of inhibition, 
one requiring resistance to response interference (comparable to the inhibitory effort in 
the day/night and whisper tasks) and one requiring resistance to proactive interference 
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from a previously relevant rule (such as in the post-switch block of the dimensional 
change card sort and other set-shifting tasks).  Being able to assess two types of 
inhibitory effort within one task allows us to compare these two types of inhibition while 
reducing potential for noise due to varying performance factors.  Finally, our task uses an 
open response format, in which a general rule is applied across various stimulus-response 
pairings.  
Our task presents a high degree of ecological validity compared to other 
laboratory tasks.  Indeed context-appropriate behavior depends crucially on creating 
novel pairings between stimulus and response rather than perseverating in inappropriate 
ways.  To achieve this level of cognitive flexibility children must be able to apply general 
rules across varying contexts that do not share particular stimulus-response pairings.  For 
example, a child must learn to take turns and wait until the opportune moment rather than 
acting impulsively whether in school with peers, at home with siblings or in a novel 
context with strangers.  Our opposites task, with its unique combination of features, 
provides a way of measuring this set of capacities, which are relevant both in principle 
and in practice. 
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Appendix
List of items used in the opposites game.
Tied Untied
Boy Girl
Flying Swimming
Healthy Sick
Hot Cold
Rainy Sunny
Closed Open
Up Down
Sleeping Awake
Empty Full
Angry Friendly
Big Small
Winter Summer
Old Baby
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Footnotes
1 This may have been because the variance unique to inhibition was captured in a 
measure of response latency and contributed to the Naming factor (see p. 444 of their 
discussion).
2 In another version of the task, children are required to “say the opposite” when they see 
a card.  Still, the correct response (“day” for night card and “night” for day card) is 
specified by the experimenter in the training phase and this stimulus-response mapping 
does not change. 
3 Some authors have suggested that inhibitory capacity is not solely responsible for 
children’s performance in the card sorting task.  Activation of previously suppressed 
information and hierarchical rule representation may also play a role (Zelazo, Müller, 
Frye & Marcovitch, 2003; Müller, Dick, Gela, Overton & Zelazo, 2006).  
4 Response interference does not arise solely from a conditioned tendency for children to 
match what they hear.  In modified versions of the day/night task, children were required 
to say “day” to abstract designs, or to say “dog” to a picture of the sun (Gerstadt et al. 
[1994] and Diamond et al. [2002]).  These conditions elicited better performance from 
four-year-olds than the classic rule “say ‘day’ to moon cards and ‘night’ to sun cards”.  
Thus it is more difficult for four-year-olds to produce an incongruent response when it is 
semantically opposed to the stimulus than when there is no semantic relation to the 
stimulus.   Response interference arises not only when children must complete an action 
going against previous actions, but specifically if there is a concurrent, competing action 
in the response set that is relevant, and prepotent.  Interference from a previously relevant 
action is reflected in the notion of proactive interference.  It is worth noting that response 
interference and proactive interference are not mutually exclusive.  Some contexts may 
call up both types of interference simultaneously.
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Table 1.
Mean Percentage Correct in Second Block by Age, Rule and Switch.  Average Raw 
Score out of Six, Standard Deviation in Parentheses.
Congruent Incongruent
Second block Second blockFirst block
No switch Switch
First block
No switch Switch
Three-year-olds
91.33 
(5.48, .712)
91.67 
(5.50, .86)
80.5 
(4.83, 1.54)
52.5 n.s.
(3.15, 2.36)
56.33 n.s.
(3.38, 2.50)
22.17 
(1.33, 1.80)
Four-year-olds
96.33 
(5.78, .545)
97 
(5.82, .48)
85.33 
(5.12, 1.37)
70 
(4.20, 2.46)
75 
(4.50, 2.30)
48.5 n.s.
(2.91, 2.33)
Five-year-olds
98.33 
(5.90, .307)
99 
(5.94, .24)
88 
(5.28, 1.64)
80.33 
(4.82, 1.78)
82.5 
(4.95, 1.91)
80.17 
(4.81, 1.60)
All means are significantly different from chance at p < .01 except those indicated by n.s.
